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                                                ABSTRACT  
 
 
                                The American University in Cairo 
 
                                            Department of Law 
 
Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Which Approach Is Closer to Arbitration? 
 
                                     Student: Ahmed Galal Zaki 
 
                                       Advisor: Amr Shalakany  
 
Adversarial techniques such as pre-trial discovery of documents, cross-
examination, and lengthy oral pleadings are now in vogue in the conduct of 
international commercial arbitration proceedings. This paper responds to this 
trend by analyzing both the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems in an 
attempt to demonstrate which is more fulfilling to the objectives of 
international commercial arbitration. These objectives are party autonomy, 
neutrality, efficiency, flexibility, and confidentiality. In the finale, the paper 
provides that although the adversarial system is in line with the autonomy 
rights of those who opt for arbitration, its inquisitorial counterpart is more 
neutral, efficient, flexible, and confidential. It argues, furthermore, that since 
arbitration is in essence a mechanism that comes at the expense of parties' 
rights in favor of the efficiency and the flexibility of the arbitral process, the 
inquisitorial system is more proximate to the objectives of international 
arbitration and, therefore, more realizing to the aspirations of its customers.  
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ADVERSARIAL OR INQUISITORIAL: 
WHICH APPROACH IS CLOSER TO ARBITRATION? 
 
 
 
Chapter I:  Introduction   
 
 
International commercial arbitration is a mechanism to resolve commercial disputes 
between international parties. It has grown to substitute for the inefficiencies of national 
litigation. People perceive arbitration as a way to resolve their disputes in an efficient, 
flexible, and speedy fashion. Indeed, the attainment of these goals depends heavily on the 
way arbitration is conducted, i.e., the proceedings that govern the arbitral process from its 
commencement to the issuance of an award. Some parties prefer the inquisitorial system 
with its active role of the arbitrator, while others seek to maintain control over the process 
by utilizing adversarial techniques, such as cross-examination and discovery of 
documents. We can also find parties utilizing an amalgam of both systems. Nonetheless, 
there is a tendency in today's international arbitration to adopt the adversarial system with 
its distinctive tools. This can be attributed to the influence of the American legal culture 
on international arbitration in general.   
     In response to this phenomenon, I will analyze in this paper the adversarial system by 
contrasting it with the inquisitorial system to see which is more compatible with the 
features of international commercial arbitration. In my view, the inquisitorial system, due 
to its efficiency, flexibility, neutrality, and confidentiality, is better than its adversarial 
kin. Although the latter upholds the autonomy rights of the parties, its very techniques 
conflict with the goals of international arbitration. Plus, maintaining rights is not the 
motto of international arbitration. Having decided to resort to arbitration, parties 
 2 
relinquish many of the rights that are guaranteed in ordinary court litigation. They prefer 
arbitration to avail themselves primarily of its efficiency and flexibility. 
     In this academic endeavor, I will invoke the arbitration rules of two major 
international arbitral institutions, namely, the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris and the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration. My aim is 
to discover their procedural nature, whether they are inquisitorial or adversarial. I will 
also explore the opinions of some prominent Egyptian international arbitrators about their 
systemic preferences when they administer the arbitral process.  
     In fact, this topic is a novelty to international arbitration academic studies. Although 
some commentators get to some extent closer to it, none of them exclusively addresses 
the suitability of the adversarial and the inquisitorial techniques with international 
arbitration. That stems in part from the fact that some of them consider the analysis of 
arbitration procedures in terms of their adversarial or inquisitorial nature overly 
simplistic.
1
 It can also be attributed to the belief espoused by others that the practice of 
international arbitration has smashed all cultural barriers and adopted a set of harmonized 
techniques that represent the best in both adversarial and inquisitorial systems.
2
 
Nonetheless, I contend that cultural differences still play a significant role in the conduct 
of arbitration proceedings to the extent of frustrating the expectations of parties to 
arbitration from different legal cultures. Thus, it is important to analyze both the 
adversarial and the inquisitorial systems in order to determine which is worthy of being 
adopted in international arbitration proceedings as it better fits with the arbitral culture.  
                                                
1See, e.g., Kathleen Paisley, Report: Commencement of the Arbitration and Conduct of the Arbitration, 
9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 107, 107 (1998).      
2See e.g., Paul D. Friedland, Combining Civil Law and Common Law Elements in the Presentation of 
Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, 12(9) INT'L ARB. REP. 25 (1997).    
 3 
     Chapter II of this paper presents a portrait of international commercial arbitration, its 
definition, features, and nature. Chapter III relates to the adversarial and the inquisitorial 
systems in terms of their philosophy and technique. Chapter IV analyzes the arbitration 
rules of both the Paris based International Chamber of Commerce and the Cairo Regional 
Centre for International Commercial Arbitration from an adversarial/inquisitorial 
perspective. Chapter V presents the opinions of some international arbitrators about the 
question of this paper. Chapter VI answers this question. Chapter VII serves as a 
conclusion.         
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Chapter II: International Commercial Arbitration  
 
In this part, I will present a portrait of international commercial arbitration that 
demonstrates its definition, features, and nature. My aim here is to single arbitration out 
as a means of settling international commercial disputes in order to determine later in this 
paper what set of procedures is most compatible with it. By design, I will emphasize the 
features that are most conducive to aim. Thus, there are some other attributes of 
international arbitration, and they are significant, that are absent from my analysis.
3
  
 
 
A. What is International Commercial Arbitration?   
 
1. Arbitration Defined.  
 
 
It is actually difficult to propose a definition of arbitration that encompasses all attempts 
made in this regard by national laws and arbitral institutions. However, I will give some 
general definitions that serve as a starting point for analyzing arbitration and illuminating 
its distinctive features.  
 
Around seventy years ago, one American court provided that:  
 
[b]roadly speaking, arbitration is a contractual proceeding, whereby the parties to any 
controversy or dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition 
of the matter involved, select judges of their own choice and by consent submit their 
controversy to such judges for determination, in place of the tribunal provided by the 
ordinary processes of law.
4
  
                                                
3For example, separability of the arbitration agreement and the competence of the arbitral tribunal to 
determine whether it has jurisdiction to look into the dispute (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) are important 
features of international commercial arbitration, but I do not address them due to their irrelevance to 
the topic of this paper. See generally ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 298-304 (4th ed. 2004) [Hereinafter REDFERN & 
HUNTER].    
4Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration – What Is It? 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1960) (quoting Gates v. 
Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1939)).    
 5 
 
Further, one commentator defines arbitration as: 
 
A device whereby the settlement of a question, which is of interest for two or more 
persons is entrusted to one or more other persons – the arbitrator or arbitrators – who 
derive their powers from a private agreement, not from the authorities of a State, and 
who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such an agreement.
5
   
 
Another commentator perceives arbitration as:  
 
A private mechanism for the resolution of disputes which takes place in private 
pursuant to an agreement between two or more parties, under which the parties agree 
to be bound by the decision to be given by the arbitrator according to law after a fair 
hearing, such decision being enforceable as law.
6
 
 
 
 
2. The Meaning of International and Commercial 
 
 
The type of arbitration which I emphasize in this paper is that which involves different 
nationalities, legal cultures, and procedural systems. It is the international rather than the 
domestic form of arbitration. Also, I address arbitrations that relate to commercial 
disputes with their special character.   
     In order to define the term "international", two main standards are used. The first one 
is the nature of the dispute which assumes that an arbitration is international if it involves 
the interests of international trade.
7
 The second standard is that of the nationality of the 
parties.
8
 According to that standard, an arbitral dispute is international provided the 
                                                
5RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1985) [hereinafter referred to as DAVID].   
6HENRY J. BROWN & ARTHUR L. MARRIOT, ADR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 56 (1993) [hereinafter 
referred to as BROWN & MARRIOT].   
7REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 16.     
8Id. at 18.   
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parties are of different nationalities, place of residence, or place of business management 
in case of corporations.
9
  
     On the other hand, it is important to know whether the legal relationship between the 
arbitrating parties is commercial or not. Problems that pertain to the enforcement of 
arbitral awards sometimes arise due to different interpretations and understandings of the 
term "commercial" by different countries.
10
 Generally speaking, commercial contracts are 
those which are made by merchants or businesspersons with respect to the normal course 
of their business.
11
  Trying to produce a monolithic approach in this regard, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law states the following:  
 
The term commercial should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters 
arising from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not.   
Relationships of a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following  
transactions: any trade transactions: any trade transaction for the supply or exchange 
of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial representation or agency;  
factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; licensing; 
investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession;  
joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-operation; carriage of goods 
or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.
12
   
 
B. The Normative Features of International Arbitration   
 
 
The above definitions highlight a number of attributes that are considered hallmarks of 
international arbitration. They distinguish arbitration as a different means of settling 
international commercial disputes vis a vis ordinary court litigation and other ADR 
techniques. As far as the purpose of this paper goes, these attributes are: party autonomy, 
neutrality, efficiency, procedural flexibility, and confidentiality. In addition, there is 
                                                
9Id.   
10Id. at 525.    
11Id. at 20.   
12Id. at 22 (quoting UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, footnote to art. 
1(1)).    
 7 
another feature that is considered, by contrast to these attributes, a disadvantage of 
international arbitration, namely, the limited powers of the arbitral tribunal.     
 
1. Party Autonomy.  
  
The principle of party autonomy is considered "one of the most fundamental 
characteristics of international commercial arbitration"
13
 By virtue of this principle, 
parties are endowed with a prior control over the arbitral process.
14
 They can determine 
the scope of their arbitration,
15
 i.e., the issues that are going to be arbitrated; they can also 
select their arbitrators and choose the venue of arbitration.
16
 In addition, parties are 
entitled to determine the law applicable to the substance of their dispute
17
 and, most 
relevantly, the procedures by which arbitrators should abide.
18
 It follows that the parties 
may adopt an adversarial or inquisitorial approach to the arbitral proceedings, or even an 
amalgam of both. 
     Nonetheless, the freedom of the parties to shape the procedural framework on which 
the arbitration is conducted does not go unbridled. It is restricted by certain 
considerations,
19
 salient among which are the following: 
 
 
                                                
13GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARY 
AND MATERIALS 44 (1994).    
14Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for 
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341, 411 (2002) [hereinafter Rogers].     
15See generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 7, at 277-313.   
16See generally id. at 210-276.   
17See generally id. at 89-154.    
18See generally id. at 314-387.    
 19There are other two considerations which are absent from this enumeration: arbitration rules and 
third parties, REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 319.    
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1-Equality  
The arbitral tribunal should treat the parties on equal footing even though they have 
agreed otherwise.
20
  The UNCITRAL Model Law emphasizes this concept by stating that 
"[t]he parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full 
opportunity of presenting his case."
21
 
2-Puplic Policy 
The arbitral award may risk being unenforceable if the arbitration is conducted in a 
manner that contradicts with the public policy of the state in which the enforcement is 
sought.
22
 
 
2. Neutrality 
 
One advantage of international commercial arbitration is ability of the parties to avoid the 
uncertainties of each other's legal system and in particular national litigation.
23
 Parties 
presume, for whatever reason, that they won't be afforded justice in their opponent's 
land.
24
 Thus, they can agree, thanks to their autonomy, upon a neutral forum, a neutral set 
of arbitrators, and even neutral rules that govern both the merits of the dispute and the 
proceedings of arbitration. In a survey on individuals participating in international 
commercial arbitration, 72 percent identified "neutrality" and 64 percent identified 
"enforceability" as "highly relevant to their decision to arbitrate."
25
 Moreover, In support 
                                                
20Id. at 317.    
21Model Law, United Nation Commission of International Trade Law, Art. 18.   
22See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 318.   
23See BROWN & MARRIOT, supra note 6, at 72.   
24Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commercial 
Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 95 (2000) [hereinafter Drahozal].    
25Id. n. 83 (citing Christian Buhring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business 395 
(1996)).   
 9 
of this advantage of arbitration, Charles N. Brower, a distinguished international 
arbitrator made the following statement:  
 
By and large, parties to international transactions choose to arbitrate eventual disputes 
. . .    because neither will suffer its rights and obligations to be determined by the 
courts of the other party's state of nationality. International arbitration thus in large 
measure a substitute for national court litigation.
26
  
 
 
3. Efficiency  
   
It has been noted that efficiency is one of the normative goals of international 
arbitration.
27
  Indeed, arbitration ensures this feature in a multifold fashion. First, 
arbitration is a cost-and-time-saving means for settling international commercial disputes. 
While some believe that arbitration is not always more cost-effective than litigation,
28
 
arbitration is still a privilege if we take into account the costs of delay and appeals before 
ordinary courts.
29
  It should be noted, moreover, that the parties in their agreement, to 
guarantee a speedy determination of their disputes, may provide for a time-limit for the 
tribunal to render the award.
30
 Some arbitral institutions provide also for this time-limit. 
For instance, the ICC Rules of Arbitration oblige the tribunal to render the award within 
six months from the date on which the terms of reference were signed by the tribunal or 
                                                
26Id. at 95 (quoting CHARLES N. BROWER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: TOWARDS JUDICIALIZATION AND UNIFORMITY? ix-x (RICHARD B. LILLICH & CHARLES N. 
BROWER EDS., 1994)).  
27See Rogers, supra note 14, at 408-410.   
28See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 28. (stating that "fees and expenses of the arbitrators 
(unlike the salary of the judge) must be paid by the parties; and in international commercial arbitrations 
of any significance, these charges may be substantial.").   
29M.I.M. ABOUL-ENEIN, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 28 (2005) [hereinafter 
ABOUL-ENEIN].     
30See DAVID, supra note 5, at 268-269 (noting that providing for a time-limit "may be regarded as 
useful to hasten the arbitrators.").   
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the parties or the date on which the tribunal was notified by the secretariat that the court 
approved these terms.
31
  
     Secondly, the arbitral award is final 
32
 and it has a res judicata effect.
33
 This means 
that the award, taking into account any procedures for challenging it,
34
 disposes finally of 
the issues submitted to the arbitral tribunal and terminates the mandate conferred upon 
it.
35
 In addition, parties are not allowed to submit to another forum, whether arbitral or 
judicial, what has been decided by the arbitral tribunal.
36
   
     Thirdly, the arbitral award is a binding determination of the legal rights of the    
parties. 
37
 By this binding nature, arbitration is distinguished from other alternative 
dispute resolution techniques.
38
 In addition, businesspersons perceive arbitral awards as 
binding because this is a promise made ab initio by them when they concluded the 
arbitration agreement and they fear being criticized by and having a bad reputation within 
their business community.
39
 A corollary of this binding effect is the international 
enforceability of the arbitral award.
40
  Arbitral awards are easier to enforce 
internationally than national court verdicts.
41
 That actually stems from the fact that 
                                                
31ICC Arbitration Rules, infra note 139, art. 24.1.   
32See generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 442.     
33See generally id, at 459-461.   
34For those procedures, see generally id., at 479-509.    
35Id. at 417.   
36DAVID, supra note 5, at 356.   
37See MICHAEL J. MUSTILL, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 44 
(1982).     
38For a thorough knowledge of alternative dispute resolution techniques see generally REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 3, at 41-54.     
39DAVID, supra not 5, at 357.    
40
See generally REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 510-561.   
41See W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS 
AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 1215 (1997) (stating that 
"[a]rbitral awards as a whole enjoy a higher degree of transnational certainty than judgments of 
national courts").   
 11 
several international conventions, salient among which is the New York Convention,
42
 
were concluded to ensure the enforceability of international arbitral awards throughout 
the world.  
     That said, I wish to have managed to draw your attention to the fact that efficiency is 
an important, if not the most, attribute of international commercial arbitration. It is 
reflected in its expeditiousness, finality, and binding effect.    
 
4. Procedural flexibility
 43
 
   
Procedural flexibility is considered one of the advantages of arbitration over litigation.
44
 
Formal and complex procedural rules are incompatible with aims of international 
commercial arbitration.
45
 Complexity detracts from the efficient and speedy resolution of 
the arbitral dispute. Due to this flexibility, parties are privileged to tailor-maid their 
arbitration procedures to fit with the nature and circumstances of their dispute.
46
 They can 
espouse the adversarial techniques of the presentation and taking of evidence or their 
inquisitorial counterparts; also possible, they can adopt a mishmash of both systems.
47
 
They may refer, moreover, to certain institutional arbitration rules
48
 or a specific national 
arbitration law.   
                                                
42Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,  21 
U.S.T. 2517 (hereinafter New York Convention).    
43For a thorough understanding of the conduct of the proceedings in international arbitration, see 
generally GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2004) 
[Hereinafter PETROCHILOS]; see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 314-387.   
44See id. REDFERN & HUNTER, at 85.    
45See GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 24 (1984).   
46REDFERN & HUNTER, at 85-86.   
47See Id., at 319-321. For a comparison of both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, see 
infra chapter III.     
48E.g., The International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Rules, and the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration, an elaborate analysis of both institutions will be provided later, 
see infra chapter IV.      
 12 
     Actually, since the parties rarely provide for procedural details in their agreement, the 
determination of the shape and character of the arbitral procedures is vested in the arbitral 
tribunal in the case of ad-hoc arbitration; and the arbitral institution in the case of 
institutional arbitration. Accordingly, the nature of the procedures hinges heavily on the 
professional background and experience of the arbitrators and the systemic predilections 
of the arbitral institution.  
     This last point raises a very important and pertinent question; since the determination 
of the procedures to be followed in the arbitral process rests, at the end of the day, in the 
hands of the arbitral institutions and most precisely the arbitral tribunal, should it be 
considered an infringement on fairness and a breach of neutrality if the arbitral tribunal 
adopts the procedural religion, i.e., adversarial or inquisitorial, of one party rather than 
the other? In other words, is the arbitral tribunal free to determine the systemic nature of 
the proceedings as long as the parties' agreement is silent?  
     In an answer to this question, one commentator provides a list of procedural principles 
that are believed to be widely applicable in international arbitration. One of those 
principles states the following: 
 
[t]he arbitral procedure should be neutral, conforming neither to the inquisitorial 
nor the adversarial model, and should be adapted to the particular circumstances 
of the case. In particular:  
(a) oral pleadings should be strictly reasonable in length;  
(b) full disclosure (as opposed to disclosure of documents on certain points only) 
should be discouraged; 
(c) the tribunal should retain full control over the proceedings;  and  
(d) the tribunal should not proceed to fix the particular rules of conduct of the 
proceedings without consulting with the parties. 
49
  
 
     In my view, since the arbitral tribunal derives its mandate from the agreement of the 
parties, it follows that as long as this agreement does not provide for a certain procedural 
                                                
49PETROCHILOS, supra note 43, at 219.   
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system, implicitly or explicitly, the tribunal is not being biased or unjust when it adopts 
the system it sees fit for the conduct of the proceedings.  
     As a final point, this feature of arbitration is being constantly overridden as arbitration 
becomes more formalized and judicialized. This is the subject of my discussion in the 
next section.  
 
5. Confidentiality 
  
Another hallmark of international commercial arbitration is its exclusion of publicity.
50
 
This option is not available when parties to a dispute go to an ordinary court of law, 
where press and public are present.
51
 In fact, commercial people resort to arbitration in 
order to be able to keep their trade secrets, know-how, financial losses, and difficulties of 
enterprises.
52
 A former Secretary-General of the ICC once stated that "[i]t became 
apparent to me very soon after taking up my responsibilities at the ICC that the users of 
international commercial arbitration, i.e. the companies, governments, and individuals 
who are parties in such cases, place the highest value upon confidentiality as a 
fundamental characteristic of international commercial arbitration."
53
   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50
DAVID, supra note 5, at 12.   
51REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 32.   
52DAVID, supra note 5, at 12.   
53Redfern & Hunter, supra note 3, at 32.   
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C. The Nature of International Arbitration   
 
International arbitration was, roughly until twenty years ago, an informal method of 
settling commercial disputes.
54
 The role of the arbitrator was merely to approximate the 
positions of the parties, trying to reach a compromise based on principles of fairness 
rather than express legal rules.
55
 Today, this image is changing as arbitration is 
metamorphosing into a judicial, formal, and adversarial process.
56
 The following lines 
will analyze this trend both in the U.S. and internationally, trying to identify its key 
causes and repercussions.   
 
1. The New Trend in the United States.  
 
Edward Brunt describes the transformation of arbitration in the United Stated in a 
noteworthy manner.
57
 He dubs the style upon which arbitration used to proceed as 
folklore.
58
 Under this folklore model, arbitration was a speedy, cheap, private, final, 
expert-based method of resolving disputes.
59
 The usual rules of evidence were not 
observed; and there was no little or no discovery.
60
 The rights of the parties were decided 
                                                
54Rogers, supra note 14, at 350.     
55See id at 351.     
56For an overview of the process of judicializing arbitration see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT 
G. GARTH, Merchants of Law as Moral Entrepreneurs: Constructing International Justice out of the 
Competition for Transnational Business Disputes, in DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL  ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 33 (1996) 
[hereinafter DEZALAY & GARTH].   
57See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model Arbitration, 74 
TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999-2000) [hereinafter Brunet].   
58Id. at 42-45.      
59Id.    
60Id. at 45.    
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according to equitable principles rather than formal legal rules and there were no 
reasoned awards.
61
   
     According to Brunet, the folklore model still exists but it has been commonly replaced 
by a judicialized form of arbitration that is called, in Brunet's terminology, contract 
model arbitration.
62
 The main characteristics of this new form are: document discovery, 
deciding the dispute according to formal legal rules, written and reasoned awards, and 
even appellate review.
63
 Brunet attributes this new trend to the competition in the 
arbitration market between arbitration providers and a need on the part of disputants for a 
judicialized model of arbitration.
64
  
     I believe that Brunet manages to contrast the extremes of the transformation process in 
a way that portrays how arbitration has turned into a judicial method of settling disputes 
in the U.S.  Now, I turn to this transformation with respect to international arbitration.   
 
2. The Judicialization of International Arbitration.  
 
As I mentioned before, international arbitration began as an informal, equitable way of 
settling disputes. Arbitrators were generally experts from the same trade with little or no 
legal background.
65
 They relied in their decisions upon gentlemanly principles such as 
amiable composition and ex aequo et bono.
 66
 Also, the use of the law of merchants or lex 
                                                
61See Id. at 42.     
62Id., at 45.   
63Id.   
64Id., at 41.   
65Rogers, supra note 14 at 351; see also DAVID, supra note 5, at 44-45.     
66See John Beechey, International Commercial Arbitration: A Process Under Review and Change, 
DISP. RESOL. J. 32 (2000) (describing the doctrine of amiable composition as "allowing arbitrators to 
decide cases in accordance with customary principles of equity and international commerce. This 
power permits arbitrators to arrive at an award that is fair in light of all circumstances, rather than strict 
conformity with legal rules, [but] …generally [they] may not disregard mandatory provisions of 
substantive law or public policy of the forum state").   
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mercatoria was in vogue.
67
 Indeed, in the old days, there was an emphasis on the just 
rather than the legal determination of the arbitral dispute. Furthermore, procedurally 
speaking, arbitrators had a strong grip over the arbitral process.
68
 They had the upper 
hand in determining what document to present and which witness to call.  
     This modus operandi of international arbitration has recently become out-of-date. The 
resolution of international dispute via arbitration is not at the moment so different from 
litigation.
69
 Arbitrators are now ordinary lawyers or academics rather than persons 
engaged in the same business as the parties to the dispute.
70
 They rarely, if ever, invoke 
amiable composition or lex mercatoria principles.
71
 Instead, parties refer in their 
agreements to formal legal rules as they are more predictable and accountable.
72
 At odds 
with the normative principles of confidentiality and privacy, arbitral awards tend to be 
reasoned and recurrently published.
73
 In a nutshell, arbitration has become a court-like 
dispute resolution method.
74
  
     Most notably, this transformation has been carried out on an adversarial scale. 
Arbitration procedural rules, being more textured but not entirely sophisticated, shifted to 
a considerable extent the control over the arbitral process from the arbitrator to the 
                                                
67Rogers, supra note 14, at 351-352 (stating that"[t]he hallmark of lex mercatoria is its insistence on 
the notion that a duty of good faith informs all contract interpretation and performance. In applying the 
lex mercatoria's requirement of good faith, arbitrators could imply terms to achieve a more equitable 
result . . .); see also David, supra note 5, 14.    
68Rogers at 351.   
69DEZALAY & GARTH, supra  note 56, at 54-57.    
70 See Jacques Werner, The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on International Arbitration, J. 
INT'L ARB. 5, 11 (1997).      
71See Drahozal, supra note 24, at 129. (stating that Stephen Bond's study of the arbitration agreement of 
parties involved in the ICC arbitration in 1987 and 1989 found that only a handful selected "general 
principles" of law to govern the parties' dispute and none specified the lex mercatoria to be the basis 
for the arbitrator's decision. Only three percent of the clauses in 1987 and four per cent in 1989 
authorized the arbitrators to decide in equity (ex aeqo et bono or as amiable compositeur)).   
72See Rogers, supra note 14, at 345.    
73Id. at 353.    
74See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 56, at 57-58.   
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parties.
75
 This manifests itself in the newly-invented parties' power to request disclosure 
of documents, decide which witnesses to present, and interview and cross-examine 
them.
76
 
     In an article written almost three years ago, Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein
77
, Director of 
the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration
78
, admits that: 
 
[T]he last few years witnessed the birth of another new trends toward the application 
of some pure adversarial procedural patterns in cases where there is no participation 
of arbitrators, parties or counsel from any of the common law countries. A notable 
number of the cases administered by the Cairo Centre in the last decade involve 
parties from civil law countries, i.e., Egyptians, French, Italians, Kuwaiti, Saudi, 
Romanian and others. It is noteworthy that the procedures in some of these cases 
were oriented towards oral hearings, although the arbitrators and lawyers involved 
were all from civil law countries. Pre-trial Discovery and cross-examination of 
witnesses were widely practiced. All details of the cases were pleaded at the oral 
hearings the same way as in the adversarial common law system.
79
  
 
 
3. The Influence of the American Legal Culture on International Arbitration.  
 
The transformation of the arbitral process into a judicial one derives from a variety of 
reasons,
80
 salient among which is the growing influence of the American legal culture 
and in particular the Anglo-American law firm on international arbitration.
81
 As 
arbitration has approached court litigation in the United States, this trend radiates towards 
the operation of arbitration throughout the world. Due to the fact that international 
                                                
75See Rogers, supra note 14, at 353.   
76Id. at 412-414.    
77For information about Dr. Aboul-Enein, see infra note 211.    
78For information about the arbitration system of the centre, see infra note 129.   
79M.I.M. Aboul-Enein, Multicultural Arbitrations: New Procedural Trends in Arab Countries, IFCA 
Newsletter, June 2003.   
80For these reasons, see generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 63.   
81See Id. at 48-52; see generally Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69 (2003).   
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arbitration is considered by American attorneys as a kind of "offshore litigation",
82
 it is 
no wonder then to find some techniques that were once deemed anathema to international  
arbitration, such as document discovery, cross-examination, and depositions, sought after 
by parties and adopted by arbitrators.  
     With that in mind, important questions come increasingly to the fore. Does this 
judicialization, or a fortiori adversarialization, phenomenon comport with the ethos of 
international commercial arbitration? Or it rather bears, as one commentator put, its 
"decline"?
83
 Is the adversarial system capable of achieving the hopes of those who resort 
to arbitration? Or should we download inquisitorial software to arbitration proceedings? 
Which one of the two procedural systems is better? Which one is closer to arbitration?  
Before embarking on an answer, let's first know what each system has in store; and also 
which one is preferred by international arbitral institutions and international arbitrators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
82REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 3 (3d ed. 1999), at 283.     
83DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 56, at 57.   
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Chapter III: The Adversarial and the Inquisitorial Systems   
 
Procedural systems are mainly divided into two: the adversarial and the inquisitorial, 
each belonging to the common law and the civil law families respectively.
84
 Although 
they sometimes overlap, each system has some features that distinguish it from the other. 
Further, each is associated with, or at least inspired by, a set of social and political beliefs 
that are thought to underlie its modus operandi. In this chapter, I will analyze both 
systems with respect to their philosophy and technique, recognizing conspicuous features 
that differentiate between them.  
 
A. Philosophy.  
 
It is difficult to grasp adversarial and inquisitorial techniques outside the cultural contexts 
in which they function. The two systems are direct manifestations of certain cultural and 
political attitudes. To be sure, every system is considered appropriate by its proponents, 
not only because it is efficient or just, but also because it serves some firmly entrenched 
values and convections.
85
  
     While the adversarial system emphasizes rights, the inquisitorial emphasizes duties.
86
 
While the adversarial calls for emancipation, the inquisitorial calls for control.
87
 
                                                
84For comparisons between the common law and the civil law systems with respect to adversarial and 
inquisitorial civil procedures, see MARY ANN GLENON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITION IN A 
NUTSHELL  95-99, 235-242 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter GLENON ET AL]; see also  KONARD ZWEIGERT & 
HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 264-284 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter ZWEIGERT & 
KOTZ].       
85Cf. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes – A Plea for Process Values, 60 
CORNELL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) (arguing that a legal process can be good not only as a means to good 
results but also as a means of implementing the values of this process).     
86See A. G. Chloros, Common Law, Civil Law and Socialist Law: Three Leading Systems of the World, 
Three Kinds of Legal Though, 9 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 11, 14-15, 17-19 (1978) [hereinafter Chloros].   
87See Id.   
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Historically, adversarialism has always been associated with individualistic cultures in 
which individual liberties transcend government power.
88
 As Oscar G. Chase put it, 
"[there] is an antipathy toward bureaucracy, hierarchical ordering. . ."
89
  Thus, the 
fairness of trial outcomes is believed to be linked to the diminished powers of the judge 
in trial proceedings.
90
 
     On the other hand, inquisitorial systems are most common in cultures where the state 
maintains law and order by virtue of its paternal authority for which everyone has to pay 
respect.
91
 There is no clamor for liberty as much as for discipline.
92
 To this end, judges 
are endowed with full control over the fact-finding process in order to get to the truth 
themselves.  
 
B. Technique.  
 
1. The Adversarial Process 
 
Given the fact that judicial authority is viewed askance, it is the parties, in adversarial 
systems, who dominate the evidence and fact gathering process.
93 
Each party is given the 
privilege of choosing which evidence to present. They have the right to select and cross-
                                                
88See John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives Opinions, 
3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L.REV. 1 (1998).     
89 Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 18  (1997) 
[hereinafter Chase].    
90See Lara M. Pair, Cross-Cultural Arbitration: Do the Differences Between Cultures Still Influence 
International Commercial Arbitration Despite Harmonization?  9 ILSA J. INT'L& COMP. L. 57, 62 
(2002) [hereinafter Pair]  
91See Chloros, supra note 86, at 17-19.    
92See Id.   
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 281.  93  
 21 
examine witnesses.
94
 The same thing applies to appointing and examining experts.
95
 They 
also have the right to request from each disclosure of certain evidence or document, 
which is known by the right to discovery.
96
 While the evidence is being presented by the 
parties, judges are all ears.
97
 They observing the game from their bench and only 
intervene if one of the parties breaks the rules or asks for help.
98
 They can also question 
the witness, but they are not expected to do that very often. There is a statement that sums 
up the passivity of judges in adversarial proceedings: "[a judge who] descends into the 
arena . . . is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict."
99
  
     Another corollary of the unreliability of judges' power is jury trial.
 
Indeed, it is this 
element that unpacks a bundle of techniques with which adversarial proceedings acquired 
their distinctive status.
 100
 At the outset, since the jury panel is composed of laymen, that 
historically were illiterate, evidence is primarily presented to them in an oral fashion.
 101
 
This justifies, and at the same time explains, the heavy dependence on oral evidence 
rather than written documents in the adversarial trial in general.  Equally important, given 
that the jury members are impaneled on a part-time basis, it is difficult to constantly 
summon them.
102
 Therefore, the trial is consolidated into a single continuous "event"
103
 
                                                
94Id.   
95Id.   
96 For an elaborate analysis of the disclosure of documents technique with respect to commercial 
arbitration, see generally Wendy Ho, Discovery in Commercial Arbitration Proceedings, 34 HOUS. L. 
REV. 199 (1997) (hereinafter Wendy).     
97ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 282.    
98Id.  
99Id. (quoting Lord Green, Yuill v. Yuill  (1945), at 15-20).   
100Id. at 280 (stating that "[o]ne decisive fact explains many of the peculiarities of Anglo-American 
procedure: it is that the procedure results from the jury trial.").   
101See GLENON ET Al., supra note 84, at 239.     
102See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 280; see also, H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF 
THE WORLD 212 (2000) (stating that jurors have day jobs).    
103This term is used in GLENON ET Al., supra note 84, at 240.   
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proceeding without interruption until its termination by a ruling.
104
 This also has a 
significant impact on the style of adversarial proceedings. It virtually dissects the process 
into pre-trial and in-trial. As a result, lawyers have to shape their case before trial in order 
to avoid any uncertainties in this one-time-shot process.
105
 They actively gather evidence 
supporting their client's claim.
106
 They also select witnesses and interview them assuring 
exactly what they will say in trial.
107
 Even more, they have the right to seek help from 
their opponents asking for disclosure of any information or documents that pertain to the 
case.
108
  
     By the time trial commences, parties will have constructed their cases, set up their 
arguments, assembled their evidence, and prepared their witness. Meanwhile, the judge 
does not even have a clue about what the dispute is about.
109
 This actually explains to a 
considerable extent why the parties should be in the vanguard in presenting evidence and 
facts as they are more knowledgeable about their case than the judge really is. With the 
foregoing, although afraid of being censured with oversimplification, I've tried to show 
that the adversarial process is an edifice of complex structures that are built upon each 
other, the basis of which is the passive role of the judge and the presence of a jury.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
104For a thorough discussion of the repercussion of consolidated and discontinuous trials, see generally 
ARTHUR VON MEHREN, LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, A GENERAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW 75-82  
(1989) [hereinafter  MEHREN].  
105Id. at 80.   
106Id.  
107Id, This behavior is considered unethical in inquisitorial systems, see ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 
84, at 281.    
108Id.   
109Id.   
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2- The Inquisitorial Process 
 
If the point of departure in adversarial proceedings is passivity on the part of the judge, it 
is the opposite in inquisitorial trials. After pleadings have been submitted by the parties, 
judges assume a proactive role in managing proceedings and gathering evidence.
110
 They 
ask parties to produce evidence and documents.
111
 They may depose and examine 
witnesses themselves rather than the parties.
112
 As the trial proceeds, judges may 
introduce new theories and issues.
113
 They are actually vested with the task of framing 
and reformulating the issues of the case with the aim of facilitating and expediting 
settlement.
114
 Parties help in achieving this goal by producing documents, selecting 
witnesses; but the lead is given to the judge. To depict this dynamic job of the judge in 
inquisitorial trials, let me quote the following:  
 
[T]he German judge sits high and exalted over the parties, dominating the 
courtroom scene; at the same time he is constantly descending to the level of the 
litigants, as an examiner, patient or hectoring, as counselor and adviser, as 
insistent promoter of settlement.
115
 
 
     Since inquisitorial trials are conducted in the absence of jurors, by contrast to 
adversary proceedings, a gamut of consequences ensues. The inquisitorial trial is a 
process of continuous hearings and meetings that take place over a period of time, in 
which evidence and facts are presented to the judge.
116
 The need for a single concentrated 
                                                
110See Chase, supra note 89, at 3.   
111Id. at 4.   
112Id  at 4-5.    
113GLENON ET Al., supra note 84, at 96.  
114Id.   
115Chase, supra note 89, at 5 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolf Schaefer, 
Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1472(1958)).     
116See GLENON ET AL., supra note 84, at 95-96.    
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trial, a la adversarial, vanishes as there is no necessity to collect a group of often busy 
people for whom the facts are presented.
117
 Thus, there is no watershed between pre-trial 
and in-trial procedures. Parties can not ask each other, as a right, to disclose information 
before trial. If it is necessary in adversarial proceedings to prepare for the case 
beforehand to avoid ambiguities, parties in inquisitorial proceedings can ask for 
adjournment to another session if they come across anything they deem worthy of 
study.
118
 Also consequential, parties can not approach witnesses before, or even after, the 
trial starts as this is considered a conduct of "improper influence".
119
  
     To sort out the chaff from the grain, I'll sum up the main differences between 
adversarial and inquisitorial processes: 
 
1- Evidence  
 
Adversarial trials depend heavily on oral evidence more than written documents. As 
stated above, this derives from the fact that the facts of the case are decided by a jury of 
commoners. Live evidence is believed to be more persuasive than papers.
120
 Conversely, 
inquisitorial judges rely on written documents as they can extract facts more quickly from 
papers than lengthy testimonies and oral arguments.
121
  
 
 
 
                                                
117See id. at 97.    
118See ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 84, at 281.     
119Id., see also MEHREN, supra note 104, at 81 (stating that "[t]he rationale advanced is that fresh and 
unrehearsed testimony is inherently more reliable than testimony given by witnesses who have already 
discussed the case with one of the lawyers.").     
120See Pair, supra note 90, at 63.     
121Id.   
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2- Witnesses  
 
In adversarial proceedings parties can be deposed as witnesses, while in inquisitorial 
systems this is unfamiliar and even proscribed.
122
 Moreover, presenting witnesses and 
cross-examining them is undertaken by parties as this is the best way to ascertain their 
credibility; but this is, generally, the job of inquisitorial judges with some help from the 
parties.
123
    
 
3- Discovery of Documents 
 
Disclosure of documents, especially before trial, is an important technique in adversarial 
trials. As discussed above, this stems in part from the fact that parties have to be 
acquainted with their case in order to be prepared for the trial event. While the trial-event 
concept in inquisitorial proceedings does not exist, there is no inter-partisan activity 
before trial. And even if discovery exists, it is always restricted by privacy 
considerations.
124
   
 
4- Record-Keeping 
 
The recording of the proceedings and witness statements in adversarial and inquisitorial 
processes manifests itself in a manner that is consistent with the rationale of each side. 
Since the adversarial system places considerable significance on oral evidence, witness 
testimony is kept in a verbatim transcript, in order for lawyers to utilize every possible 
                                                
122Id. at 65.    
123Id. at 65-66.    
124Id. at 64.    
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word in confronting witnesses by cross-examination.
125
 But while this is not the approach 
of the inquisitorial system, judges just take notes of testimonies composing a summary of 
what has been said.
126
    
     By and large, while both systems may possibly overlap, we have always to remind 
ourselves that the "grand discriminant"
127
 between them is the active role of the judge vis 
a vis party control. Indeed, this point should inform our analysis of any potential 
procedural systems should we wish to recognize their systemic nature. 
     Having exposed the philosophy and technique of both adversarial and inquisitorial 
processes, let's now turn to analyze the arbitration proceedings of the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris and the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration in order to know to which procedural system they belong.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
125Lawrence W. Newman, International Arbitration Hearings: Showdown or Denouement? 5 TUL.  J. 
INT'L &COMP. L. 3933,  395-396 (1997) [hereinafter Newman].     
126
Id.   
127This term was used by John Langbein when describing the difference between American and 
German procedural systems stating that the "grand discriminant between the two legal cultures [is] 
adversarial versus judicial responsibility for gathering and presenting the facts", John Langbein, The 
German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 863 (1985) [hereinafter Langbein].   
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Chapter IV: Institutional Procedural Rules  
 
In this chapter, I will analyze the procedural rules of two major international arbitral 
institutions, namely, the Paris based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the 
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). My 
objective here is to observe how the arbitral process proceeds according to the rules of 
these two institutions and, thereby, determine the nature of their procedural systems; is it 
adversarial, inquisitorial, or an amalgam of both? Therefore, I will emphasize the rules 
that are most conducive to this aim. It should be noted, furthermore, that choosing these 
two institutions is far from gratuitous. On the one hand, the ICC is the oldest and most 
well-established arbitral institution all over the world.
128
 On the other hand, the CRCICA 
is a relatively new-player in the international arbitration market.
129
 It will be interesting, 
thus, to know on which procedural yardstick old and new arbitral institutions conduct 
their arbitrations.     
     Examining the procedural rules of the ICC
130
 and the CRCICA
131
 from an 
adversarial/inquisitorial perspective involves the following:  
 
 
                                                
128See generally W. LAWRENCE CRAIG ET AL, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 
(2d ed. 1990); see also Eric A. Schwartz, The Resolution of International Commercial Disputes Under 
the Auspices of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 719 
(1994-1995).    
129See generally M.I.M Aboul Enein, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the Cairo Regional Centre for 
Commercial Arbitration, I NT'L TAX & BUS. LAW  256 (1986).            
130See International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (Jan. 1, 1998), available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf_documents/rules/rules_arb_english.pdf. 
(hereinafter ICC Rules).     
131Arbitration Rules of the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration (Oct. 1, 
2000),  available at  http://www.crcica.org.eg/arbitration_rules.html. (hereinafter CRCICA Rules). 
Please note that the Cairo centre is currently amending its arbitration rules, the draft amendment of 
these rules is available at  http://www.crcica.org.eg/CRCICA_New_English_Rules.pdf.            
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A.  Initiation of the proceedings. 
B. The Role of the Arbitral Institution. 
C. The Role of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
D. The Role of the Parties. 
E. Hearings. 
F. Witnesses and Experts. 
G. Discovery.  
 
A. Initiation of the Proceedings  
 
Under the ICC procedural system, the arbitral process kicks off with a "request" lodged 
by the claimant to the secretariat of the International Court of Arbitration (the arbitral 
body of the ICC) which, on its part, informs the respondent of the receipt of this request 
and the date of such receipt;
132
 this date serves as the opening date of the arbitral 
process.
133
  
     But this technique differs when shifting to the CRCICA procedural rules; in that the 
claimant gives a "notice" to the respondent expressing its need to resort to arbitration.
134
 
The date on which the respondent receives such notice is considered to be the date of 
initiating arbitration.
135
   
     This is to illustrate the active role of the parties under the CRCICA rules in initiating 
the arbitral process, while there is a considerable involvement by the arbitral institution in 
such process under the ICC rules.  
                                                
132
ICC Rules, supra note 130, art. 4(1).   
133Id. art. 4(2).     
134CRCICA Rules, supra note 131, art. 3(1).   
135Id. art. 3(2).   
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B. The Role of the Arbitral Institution  
 
The arbitral body of the ICC is the International Court of Arbitration (the ICC Court).
136
 
It functions independently of the ICC to ascertain the settlement by arbitration of 
international, or non-international, commercial disputes in tandem with the ICC rules of 
arbitration.
137
  
     In contrast, the CRCICA does not have a parallel arbitration court, and it does not 
even play that pivotal role which is assumed by the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration in administering the arbitral process. To single out this role on the part of the 
ICC court, I will compare the ICC and the CRCICA arbitration rules with respect to two 
areas, the establishment of the arbitral tribunal and rendering the award.  
 
1- Establishing the Arbitral Tribunal 
                                                            
The ICC court plays a salient part in establishing the arbitral tribunal. It enjoys ample 
powers in appointing and confirming arbitrators.
 138
 From the outset, in case the parties 
do not agree upon the number of arbitrators, the ICC court appoints a sole arbitrator, 
unless the ICC court estimates that the dispute needs to be settled by three arbitrators.
 139
 
If it does, each party then has to nominate one arbitrator.
140
 In case the parties agree to 
appoint one arbitrator for settling their dispute, they have to agreeably nominate one 
                                                
136ICC Rules, supra note 130, art. 1(1). To get yourself acquainted with this court, see id, appendix I 
(Statute of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC) & appendix II (Internal Rules of the 
International Court of Arbitration of the ICC).     
137
ICC rules arts. 1(1), 1(2).   
138Id. art. 9.   
139Id. art. 8(2).   
140Id.   
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arbitrator; this nomination is nonetheless subject to the ICC court's confirmation.
141
 But if 
they fail to do so, this arbitrator should be appointed by the ICC court.
142
 In case the 
parties agree to appoint three arbitrators, each party has to nominate one arbitrator to be 
confirmed by the ICC court.
143
 The third arbitrator is to be appointed then by the ICC 
court, provided the parties did not agree on nominating this arbitrator themselves or by 
any other means.
144
 In the latter situation, as the case always is, this nomination is subject 
to the ICC court's confirmation.
145
 Again, if the parties fail to nominate the third 
arbitrator within certain periods of time, the ICC court should appoint this arbitrator.
146
 In 
addition to these powers in appointing and confirming arbitrators, the ICC court assumes 
an equal clout in cases of challenging
147
 or replacing
148
 arbitrators.  
     When we turn our attention to the CRCICA, establishing the arbitral tribunal is mainly 
vested in the parties. That is why I will discuss it in relative details in the forthcoming 
section of The Role of the Parties. Suffice it to note here that the arbitral institution under 
the CRCICA rules appoints arbitrators or designate appointing authorities only if the 
parties ask it to make such appointment or designation in certain cases.
149
                         
2- Rendering the Award 
                                         
                                                
141Id. art. 8(3).   
142Id.  
143Id. art 8(4).    
144Id.   
145Id.   
146
Id.   
147Id. art. 11.   
148Id. art. 12.   
149See infra notes 188, 190, 192.     
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Arbitral awards under both the ICC and the CRCICA procedural rules are rendered by a 
majority, reasoned decision.
150
 However, the ICC empowers its court with a distinctive 
function to ensure the proper application of its arbitration rules. The tribunal should 
present a draft form of the award to the court in order to review and approve it.
151
 
Rendering the award is contingent upon such approval by the court.
152
 It may possibly 
adjust the form of the award as it sees fit, and it can also give notice to the tribunal with 
respect to substantial issues.
153
 The same applies to any correction or interpretation 
directed to the award by the tribunal.
154
 It should be noted, furthermore, that the court 
members, when reviewing the draft award, bear in their minds the mandatory law of the 
place in which arbitration takes place.
155
 That actually raises a question pertaining to 
potential contradictions between mandatory law provisions and the arbitral agreement, 
which one overweigh the other? I will answer this question when writing my comments 
at the end of this part.   
  
C. The Role of the Arbitral Tribunal 
                                                               
The arbitral tribunal plays a very proactive role in administering the arbitral process 
under the ICC arbitration rules. To begin with, the tribunal is vested with the task of 
drawing up, in the presence of the parties, the terms of reference which include, inter 
alia, the claims of the parties and the issues to be determined.
156
 Also, the tribunal is 
                                                
150ICC Rules, arts. 25(1), 25(2); CRCICA Rules arts. 31(1), 32(3).   
151ICC Rules, art. 27.    
152Id.   
153
Id.   
154Id. art. 29.   
155Appendix II, supra note 136, art. 6.   
156ICC Rules, art. 18(1).   
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presumed to establish, with help from the parties, a timetable by which arbitration should 
proceed.
157
 Most importantly, the tribunal assumes the responsibility of establishing the 
facts of the case as expeditiously as possible by every proper manner,
158
 provided the 
parties are treated fairly and impartially.
159
 To this end, it is "in full charge of the 
hearings".
160
  It can, with assistance from the parties, appoint experts and decide to hear 
witnesses.
161
 It may ask any party to provide additional evidence.
162
 It can order, in 
response to parties' demand, conservatory or interim measures.
 163
 Further, it can ask the 
ICC court to extend the time limit for rendering the final award.
164
 Finally, the tribunal 
may close the proceedings when it rests assured that the parties presented their respective 
sides with a "reasonable opportunity".
165
 Before shifting to the CRCICA rules, I would 
like to draw your attention that the ICC rules in their final article assign the tribunal, and 
the court, with the task of ensuring that the award will be "enforceable at law".
166
 Could 
this be at the expense of the expectations of the parties? In other words, are the tribunal 
and the court entitled to disregard the provisions of the arbitration agreement in order to 
make sure that the award will be enforceable? I will get to this point in my final 
comments.     
     Under the CRCICA procedural rules, the arbitral tribunal has the privilege of 
conducting the arbitration by any means it sees fit as long as the parties are treated 
                                                
   157Id.  art. 18(4).   
158Id.  art. 20(1).   
159Id.  art. 15(2).   
160Id.  art. 21(3).   
161Id.  arts. 20(3), 20(4).   
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163Id.  art. 23.   
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166Id. art. 35.   
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equally and fairly.
167
  The tribunal can hold a preliminary meeting with the parties in 
order to sign the terms of reference and set a procedural timetable for running the 
arbitration.
168
 Besides the statements of claim and defense, the tribunal can ask the parties 
to submit additional written statements.
169
 Further, the tribunal can order the production 
of documents or evidence upon which the parties depend in their statements of claim or 
defense or any other documents or evidence within certain periods of time as the tribunal 
decides.
170
 If any party requests, the tribunal can order any appropriate interim 
measure.
171
 It can also appoint experts to uncover certain intricacies.
172
  
     It should be noted, in addition, that the CRCICA tribunal can at its own discretion 
prolong the time limits provided for the communication by the parties of statements of 
claim and defense.
173
 And it reserves the right to terminate or continue the proceedings in 
case the claimant fails to communicate its statements of claim or the respondent fails to 
communicate its statement of defense, respectively, within fixed periods of time.
174
 Also, 
the tribunal may go on with a hearing even though one of the parties does not show up.
175
 
It can decide the case on the available evidence in case one of the parties does not 
provide for the documentary evidence required from it.
176
 At last, having made sure the 
parties have presented their cases satisfactorily, the tribunal can order the closure of 
                                                
167CRCICA Rules, supra note 131, art. 15(1).   
168Id.   
169Id. art. 22.     
170Id. arts. 24(2), 24(3).   
171Id. art. 26(1).   
172Id. art. 27(1).   
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175Id. art. 28(2).   
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hearings;
177
 nonetheless, it can reopen them discretionally or pursuant to a plea from a 
party for "exceptional circumstances".
178
   
     From the foregoing, the active role of both ICC and CRCICA tribunals is obvious, but 
it is more conspicuous under the ICC rules.   
 
D. The Role of the Parties 
                                          
As demonstrated above, parties to an arbitration under the ICC Rules play a subordinate 
role to that of the ICC court in establishing the arbitral tribunal. Even after the 
establishment of that tribunal, their role remains typical of its auxiliary character. Here 
are some of the privileges given to the parties while participating in ICC arbitrations. At 
first, they take part ab initio in drawing up the terms of reference and the procedural 
timetable.
179
 They are entitled to a "reasonable opportunity" for presenting their 
positions.
180
 Moreover, they are entitled to a hearing
181
 in which they can question 
experts appointed by the tribunal.
182
 They can also appoint witnesses and experts.
 183
 Also 
noteworthy, parties can agree between themselves to shorten the time limits provided for 
by ICC Rules.
184
 However, this agreement is subject to the approval of the arbitral 
                                                
177Id. art. 29(1).  
178Id. art. 29(2).   
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tribunal
185
 and the discretion of the ICC court to extend any time limit curtailed by the 
parties.
186
  
     On the other hand, the role of the parties to CRCICA arbitrations is by no means 
minor. Initially, they participate vigorously in establishing the arbitral tribunal. In case of 
appointment of one arbitrator, they may agree between each other on the name of such 
arbitrator, or the appointing authority to make such appointment.
187
 If neither technique 
worked out, they can ask the CRCICA to make such appointment.
188
  Further, in case of 
agreeing to settle the dispute by three arbitrators, each party should appoint one arbitrator 
and the two appointed arbitrators should agree between themselves upon the third 
presiding arbitrator.
189
 If any of the parties refrained from appointing its arbitrator, the 
other can ask the appointing authority, previously agreed upon by the parties, to make 
such appointment; and if this ended in vain or the appointing authority did not exist from 
the beginning, the CRCICA should appoint such arbitrator or designate the appointing 
authority upon request from this party.
 190
  If the two appointed arbitrators did not manage 
to agree on the third one, the appointing authority should make this appointment, 
following the same foregoing procedures.
191
  Parties, also, can agree on the number and 
means of appointing arbitrators in case of multi-party arbitrations; and if they fail, the 
CRCICA kicks in to establish the tribunal upon request from the parties.
192
 Equally 
notable, parties participate in the processes of challenging and replacing arbitrators.
 193
 
                                                
185Id.  
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     Furthermore, unlike the case with ICC arbitrations, the burden of proof with respect to 
the facts of a case submitted to CRCICA arbitration lies on the parties.
194
  Therefore, 
parties are entitled to a "full opportunity" for presenting their cases.
195
 They can ask for a 
hearing in order to present witnesses, experts or for oral arguments.
196
 They can, also, 
examine experts appointed by the tribunal and present their own expert witnesses who 
give testimony on contentious issues.
197
   
 
E. Hearings 
                   
As stated above, parties under both ICC and CRCICA procedural rules are entitled to 
hold hearings in which oral evidence is presented, witnesses are heard, and experts are 
examined. Nonetheless, this right turns into a discretionary tool in the hands of the 
tribunal unless the parties avail themselves of it. In other words, if neither one of the 
parties requests a hearing, it is merely up to the tribunal to hold such a hearing or to 
determine the case only on the basis of written documents or other materials submitted to 
it.
198
  
     In tandem with the confidentiality of arbitration, moreover, hearings are not held in 
public without parties' approval.
199
 Also, persons alien to the arbitral process are denied 
access to it without the authorization of both the tribunal and the parties.
200
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F. Witnesses and Experts  
                                         
Parties under both the ICC and the CRCICA procedural rules have the privilege, as stated 
above, to present witnesses and experts. The tribunals of both institutions have the power, 
also, to appoint experts to report on certain issues. Notably, the rules of both institutions 
give the parties the right to examine only experts appointed by the tribunal. There is no 
reference whatsoever to any powers conferred upon the parties to examine, let alone 
cross-examine, witnesses or experts initially presented by them. 
     In addition, with an adversarial attitude, the CRCICA rules, at odds with ICC rules, 
consider signed written statements of witnesses "affidavits"  valid evidence.
201
  
 
G. Discovery  
                       
There are two provisions in CRCICA rules that bear some resemblance to those articles 
which provide for disclosure of documents as practiced in adversarial systems. The first 
states that "[a]ll documents or information supplied to the arbitral tribunal by one party 
shall at the same time be communicated by that party to the other party."
202
 The second 
states the following:  
The arbitral tribunal may, if it considers it appropriate, require a party to 
deliver to the tribunal and to the other party . . . a summary of the documents 
and other evidence which that party intends to present in support of the facts in 
issue set out in his statement of claim or   statement of defense.
 203
  
 
     If we consider such approach to be a discovery of documents, there is not an 
equivalent to it in ICC rules. 
                                                
201CRCICA Rules, art. 25(5).   
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     After analyzing the procedural systems of both institutions, I will consume some lines 
to make the following arguments: 
     First, under the ICC procedural system, the helm of the arbitral process is assumed by 
both the International Court of Arbitration and the arbitral tribunal, with assistance from 
the parties. The court maintains a strong grip over appointing arbitrators and rendering 
awards, by virtue of its approval capacities. The arbitral tribunal also dominates the 
conduct of the proceedings by the vast powers vested in it by the ICC rules. Further, this 
dominant role on the part of both the court and the tribunal gets all the more vigorous by 
the fact that the court considers, when reviewing awards, the mandatory law of the place 
of arbitration,
204
 and the fact that they both have to ensure the enforceability of these 
awards.
205
 This possibly implies that the tribunal, when deciding disputes, and the court, 
when reviewing awards, can set aside some provisions the parties have explicitly 
stipulated in their arbitral agreement for the sake of bowing down to the mandatory law 
of the place of arbitration, and for guaranteeing the enforceability of the prospective 
award. Indeed, this puts into question the commitment on the part of both the court and 
the tribunal to a fundamental arbitral principle, namely, party autonomy, and sheds, 
thereby, some curtains of doubt over the suitability of the active roles of both the court 
and the tribunal with the values of international commercial arbitration. 
     Second, while the arbitral tribunal under the CRCICA rules is actively involved in the 
conduct of the proceedings, the parties also assume a dynamic part in pushing the arbitral 
process forward. As stated earlier, they initially start the arbitral process with no support 
from the CRCICA; they are vested with the task of appointing arbitrators; they also 
shoulder the responsibility of proving the facts of their cases. Therefore, under the 
                                                
204See supra note 155.   
205See supra note 166.    
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CRCICA rules, the progression of arbitration is an undertaking divided equally between 
the arbitral tribunal and the parties.  
     Third, the procedural systems of both the ICC and the CRCICA have a lot in common, 
such as deciding the dispute only of the basis of documents in case neither party requests 
a hearing. However, the ICC rules are distinctive with some inquisitorial techniques, such 
as the powerful grip of the ICC court and tribunal over the proceedings. And the 
CRCICA rules are distinctive with some adversarial features, namely, affidavit evidence, 
and, as I may call it, "distorted" discovery of documents.   
     Fourth, although CRCICA rules embrace the above stated adversarial techniques, they 
lack many features that are eponymous of the adversarial system, and indeed vital in 
measuring the adversariality of a given procedural system, for instance, the dichotomy of 
the trial process into pre-trial and in-trial. Equally noteworthy, cross-examination of 
witnesses and experts is nonexistent. As stated above, the only kind of examination is 
mentioned with regard to experts appointed by the tribunal rather than the parties. Also, 
the concept of a hearing, in which oral evidence is submitted, is not clearly underscored, 
as the tribunal can do without a hearing and decide the dispute on the bases of documents 
absent the parties request for a hearing.   
     Fifth, against this background, I can say that the ICC arbitration rules are purely 
inquisitorial; the tribunal and the ICC court are in the vanguard of the arbitral process; 
parties are only assistants; hearings are not mandatory and the tribunal can decide the 
dispute only on the basis of documents; all adversarial techniques are absent. On the 
other hand, I can not say that the CRCICA rules are either adversarial or inquisitorial; 
leading the proceedings is divided between the tribunal and the parties; the concept of a 
hearing is not given prevalence; although there are some adversarial techniques, others 
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are not established. Thus, in my view, these rules are an amalgam of both the adversarial 
and the inquisitorial systems.  
     Having consulted the ICC and the CRCICA about which procedural system is most 
convenient with international commercial arbitration, let's do the same with international 
arbitrators themselves.  
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Chapter V: Opinions of International Arbitrators  
 
In this chapter, I will explore the opinions of five Egyptian international arbitrators about 
which procedural system, i.e., adversarial or inquisitorial, better fits with international 
commercial arbitration. Their opinions were obtained through interviews conducted 
personally with them, save for Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein whom I interviewed by 
telephone. I held interviews with other international arbitrators, but I chose to display 
only the opinions of these five for purposes of conciseness as they embrace all potential 
answers to my question. These arbitrators are: Dr. Karim Hafez, Sarwat Abdel-Shahid, 
Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein, Dr. Mohamed Abdel-Ra'oof, and Dr. Mohamed Badran.
206
   
 
A. Dr. Karim Hafez
207
 
 
Dr. Hafez believes that it is impossible to determine the suitability of either adversarial or 
inquisitorial proceedings with international arbitration in general because there is no 
arbitral yardstick against which we can do so. There is no monolithic culture of 
arbitration that encompasses general principles and features with which a set of 
procedures fits and another does not. The culture of arbitration is amoebic. It has no 
uniform character. It includes different types of arbitration with different attributes. There 
is maritime arbitration, construction arbitration, petroleum extraction arbitration, and so 
on. Although they are all international and commercial, every kind has its exigencies that 
call for a certain type of procedure. For example, the adversarial system might fit with 
maritime arbitration, given the fact that the substantive law that applies to this kind of 
                                                
206These names are put in an alphabetical order.   
207Attorney at law; international arbitrator; LL.M., LL.D., Cambridge University.   
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arbitration is affected by British common law and the attorneys representing parties are 
mainly British. Meanwhile, this system might not fit with other types of arbitration such 
as construction arbitration.    
     Moreover, the suitability of any of the two procedural systems with international 
arbitration, Dr. Hafez thinks, raises no problems in practice. All participants of 
international arbitration, whether arbitrators, parties, or institutions, no longer maintain 
these dogmatic predilections with respect to a certain procedural system. Their exposure 
to different legal systems makes them more receptive to procedures of other cultures. 
When empanelled as an arbitrator, Dr. Hafez provides, he does not care whether he 
follows adversarial or inquisitorial procedures. He just attempts to respect the 
expectations of the parties and the cultural background of his colleagues on the arbitral 
panel. In sum, Dr. Hafez does not believe there is an international arbitration culture out 
there that is consistent with one procedural system over another. This issue has to be 
determined on a case by case basis. 
208
     
 
B. Sarwat Abdel-Shahid
209
  
 
Mr. Abdel-Shahid considers the adversarial system more appropriate for international 
arbitration than the inquisitorial system. In his view, the latter corresponds to the most 
important principle of international arbitration, i.e., party autonomy. Plus, it achieves a 
speedy settlement of the arbitral dispute by empowering parties and giving them a 
dominant role over the proceedings, as direct communication between them is the best 
way to expedite the arbitral process. With respect to truthfulness, it is the adversarial 
                                                
208Interview with Dr. Karim Hafez, Cairo (Apr.20, 2006).   
209Former judge at the Egyptian State Council; attorney at law; international arbitrator; head of Sarwat 
Abdel-Shahid Law Firm.     
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system that is closer to achieving this value. By techniques such as discovery of 
documents, no party can hide any document or evidence that is crucial to reach the truth. 
Additionally, this technique allows the arbitral tribunal to ensure the real intentions of the 
parties. Cross-examinations is also a vital technique to uncover the truth. With the parties 
examining each other's witnesses and disproving each other's arguments, the arbitrator 
can tell which argument is more truthful. Overall, Mr. Abdel-Shahid deems the 
adversarial system not only more suitable for international arbitration, but generally 
superior to the inquisitorial system.
210
   
 
C. Dr. Mohamed Aboul-Enein
211
 
 
Dr. Aboul-Enein does not favor one procedural system over the other. He deems one of 
the most valuable advantages of arbitration to be its procedural flexibility that permits the 
parties to tailor the arbitral proceedings according to their needs and the nature of their 
dispute. By reason of this flexibility, parties can combine the best techniques in both 
systems in their arbitration. On the one hand, Dr. Aboul-Enein prefers the arbitrator to 
have a dominant role over the proceedings. The arbitrator should appoint experts, 
question witnesses, and ask parties to provide further evidence. This guarantees an 
efficient and speedy resolution of the arbitral dispute; and it prevents the stronger party 
from overshadowing the weaker. On the other hand, he prefers such adversarial 
techniques as cross-examination and discovery of documents. They are also required for 
an efficient resolution of the dispute. But still they both should be under the supervision 
of the judge, particularly, discovery of document. It should not be as expansively 
                                                
210Interview with Sarwat Abdel-Shahid, in Cairo (Apr.18, 2006).    
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International Commercial Arbitration; international arbitrator; LL.M, University of California; S.J.D, 
University of Southern Methodist.  
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practiced as in U.S. courts; such expansion would encumber the arbitral process and 
render it less speedy.
212
  
 
D. Dr. Mohamed Abdel-Raoof
213
 
 
In Dr. Abdel-Raoof's view, the procedural system that best comports with international 
arbitration is the one that is most conducive to its objectives, namely, justice, efficiency, 
speed, and flexibility. The inquisitorial system is more fulfilling of these goals. The 
active role of the arbitrator guarantees the just and efficient resolution of the arbitral 
dispute. To illustrate the significance of this role, Dr. Abdel-Raoof recalled a personal 
experience. In one of the arbitral disputes in which he was impaneled as an arbitrator, 
there was a document that one party was supposed to submit. This party did not submit 
this document and the other two arbitrators were not willing to ask for its submission. Dr. 
Abdel-Raoof managed to convince his colleagues to change their passive attitude. They 
then ordered this party to present the required document. Surprisingly, this document was 
so vital to the extent that it changed their previous approach to the dispute. On the other 
hand, Dr. Abdel-Raoof considers such adversarial techniques as discovery of documents 
and verbatim record-keeping time-consuming and impractical. However, he sometimes 
permit parties to cross-examine each other's witnesses but under his control and 
supervision.
214
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E. Dr. Mohamed Badran
215
 
 
Dr. Badran believes, at the outset, that it is difficult to determine the consistency of either 
system with international arbitration without accompanying cultural inclinations. Those 
of common law countries think that their adversarial system is fairer and more efficient 
and therefore more suitable with international arbitration. The same applies to those of 
civil law countries with respect to their procedural system. However, in my interview 
with him, Dr. Badran tried to give his cultural bias a break in order to determine the 
suitability of adversarial and inquisitorial procedures with international arbitration. He 
deems the inquisitorial system more proximate to fairness and justice at the expense of 
practicality. By contrast, the adversarial system is more flexible and practical but to the 
detriment of fairness and justice. In his view, that stems from the fact that the 
inquisitorial system grew in the civil law system which was developed by scholars and 
academics who put rigid principle to govern people's dealings with little regard for the 
constantly changing circumstances. But the adversarial system matured in the common 
law system which was developed by traders and merchants who were all the more keen to 
establish flexible rules to cope with different times. Thus, since parties resort to 
international arbitration for its flexibility, it is the adversarial system that responds to 
their expectations.
216
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
215Head of Public Law Department, Faculty of Law, Cairo University; attorney at law; international 
arbitrator; LL.M., LL.D., Birmingham University.        
216Interview with Dr. Mohamed Badran, Cairo (May 3, 2006).    
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After displaying these five opinions, I will make the following comments: 
     First, all opinions approach the suitability issue from different perspectives. Two of 
them favor the adversarial system, one favors the inquisitorial, one favors a mixture of 
both systems, and one basically deems this suitability inconceivable.   
     Second, I do not share with Dr. Hafez his view that there is no arbitral standard with 
which we can determine the compatibility of either procedural system with international 
arbitration. It might be true that there are various types of arbitration, each one 
maintaining an exclusive nature. However, that does not mean that there is no 
overarching arbitration culture, under which all kinds of arbitration share common 
features and objectives that distinguish them from ordinary court litigation. As I stated in 
part one of this paper, party autonomy, neutrality, efficiency, flexibility, and 
confidentiality are all features that should attend the arbitral process. Without these 
features, international arbitration loses its raison d'etre. Thus, we can assess the 
suitability of any potential procedural system with international arbitration by invoking 
such features.  
     Third, although Dr. Aboul-Enein favors a mishmash of adversarial and inquisitorial 
procedures, his attitude essentially favors the inquisitorial system. Given the fact that the 
main difference between the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems is the passive vis a 
vis active role of the judge, and since Dr. Aboul-Enein supports an active role of the 
arbitrator, he actually drifts towards the inquisitorial system. His support for such 
adversarial techniques as discovery of documents and cross-examination is of little 
significance here, since they should be conducted, in his view, under the control of the 
arbitrator.  
     Fourth, Dr. Badran's analysis is too general to determine the attributes of both 
adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings. Rather than examining the real mechanisms of 
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both systems, he puts all his credit in evaluating the cultural backgrounds of their 
respective parent systems. Although supportive, cultural underpinnings should not divert 
our attention from analyzing the actual procedural devices of adversarial and inquisitorial 
processes in the pursuit of identifying their features. Moreover, Dr. Badran's analysis just 
tackles the law-making rationale of common law and civil law systems, with no regard 
for the direct cultural justifications for trial proceedings in both systems. He does not 
explain why judges in common law systems should remain passive throughout the trial 
process while their civilian counterparts remain active, and how this informs the 
character of the trial. In sum, Dr. Badran's analysis, in my view, lacks the required 
specificity to capture the real characteristics of the adversarial and the inquisitorial 
systems.   
     Fifth, although they reach the same conclusion, Mr. Abdel-Shahid deviates from the 
road taken by Dr. Badran in his analysis. He emphasizes the very techniques of the 
adversarial system, considering them more compatible with the principles of international 
arbitration.  
     That said, let me now give my personal opinion about which procedural system better 
fits with the international commercial arbitration.  
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Chapter VI: Which Is Better? 
 
In this chapter, I will measure the proximity of both adversarial and inquisitorial systems 
to the normative attributes of international commercial arbitration which I set out in part 
one of this paper, i.e., party autonomy, neutrality, efficiency, flexibility, and 
confidentiality. I will explain first why it is important to know which procedural system 
is more compatible with international arbitration. Then, I will proceed with my analysis 
showing at the end that the inquisitorial system is generally more fulfilling to the 
aspirations of those who resort to arbitration.    
 
A. Why is it important to explore the suitability of both systems with international 
arbitration? 
 
As demonstrated earlier in this paper, arbitration is moving in the route of judicialization 
and adversarialization.
217
 Today, adversarial techniques are noticeably taking root in the 
conduct of international arbitration proceedings. It important, therefore, to scrutinize this 
phenomenon to know whether the adversarial system is in harmony with international 
commercial arbitration, and accordingly whether parties should utilize it in their 
arbitrations. 
     Furthermore, given the fact that neither ad hoc nor institutional arbitration provide ab 
initio for answers to the nitty-gritty of arbitration proceedings,
218
 background cultural 
differences between the parties to arbitration, as opposed what Dr. Hafez believes,
219
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pose a considerable threat to the predictability of its proceedings and, thereby, to the 
proper resolution of  arbitral disputes.
220
 Possibly, one common law party might regard 
discovery of documents as a means of building its case, while the other civilian party 
perceives such technique, if ever has a clue of what it means, as hazardous to its 
commercial secrets.
221
 One party might perceive cross-examination as the most efficient 
way of testing witness credibility, while the other depends on the judge to do this job. 
One party might prepare and coach its witness prior to standing for testimony, while the 
other sees this conduct as unethical.
222
   
     Even worse, this discrepancy finds expression in the attitudes of the arbitrators 
themselves. To give an example, an arbitrator with a civil law background might regard 
an extensive oral argument by a common law lawyer as superfluous and therefore 
untrustworthy.
223
 Meanwhile, a common law arbitrator might be dissuaded by a succinct 
oral argument made by a civilian lawyer.
224
 Should the scope of this paper permit, I can 
enumerate a list of similar inconsistencies.  
     It is important, therefore, to determine, in a common law/civil law cultural vacuum, 
the suitability of both adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings with international 
arbitration in order for the arbitration community at large, whether parties, arbitrators, or 
institutions, to cast away any cultural predilection, and adopt the very set of procedures 
that is compatible with the features and objectives of international arbitration. Although it 
is not that easy to root out cultural beliefs, I would be more than satisfied if answering 
this question managed, even to a little extent, to do so.     
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B. The Suitability of the Adversarial and the Inquisitorial Systems with the 
Normative Attributes of International Commercial Arbitration.  
 
The suitability test involves the following: 
 
1. Party Autonomy 
  
As demonstrated earlier, party autonomy is one of the most basic principles of 
international arbitration.
225
 It is the very right that authorizes parties to eschew judicial 
jurisdiction and opt for arbitration. Similarly, it is the same principle that characterizes 
adversarial trials and gives reason to many of its taken-for-granted techniques, such as 
cross-examination and discovery. Indeed, both the adversarial system and arbitration 
share in common the philosophy of sidelining state power, incarnated in its judicial 
authority, in favor of party independence and domination. Parties in both institutions do 
not trust the government to administer their disputes. They prefer to sort out their own 
affairs themselves.    
     In contrast, the inquisitorial system detracts from the autonomy of the parties to 
arbitration. It confers more control over the arbitral process upon the arbitral tribunal 
rather than the parties. They just assist the tribunal to decide their dispute. In that sense, 
the inquisitorial system contradicts with the autonomy rights of the parties with which 
they are entitled to initiate their arbitration in the first place. I illustrated this 
contradiction when analyzing the arbitration rules of the ICC.
226
 By virtue, of the vast 
powers vested in them in administering the arbitral process, the ICC court and the arbitral 
tribunal may disregard manifest provisions the parties have agreed upon. It follows, then, 
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that the adversarial system is more fulfilling of that aspect of arbitration than its 
inquisitorial counterpart. It is the system that corresponds with and supplements the 
autonomy of the parties when conducting arbitration. But, does that suffice to conclude 
that the adversarial system is generally more compatible with arbitration than the 
inquisitorial? Of course it does not. Parties do not turn to arbitration just for exercising 
their autonomy; there are other considerations that should not fall out of our evaluation. 
Let's move on with the suitability test.  
 
2. Neutrality 
 
Contesting parties from different countries resort to international arbitration, as noted 
above, because they fear they will not be afforded justice by each other's national 
courts.
227
 Impartiality and justice are, indeed, significant targets that parties aspire to 
attain by going to arbitration. Let's now see how adversarial and inquisitorial systems 
work to achieve these valuable concepts.    
     Some commentators argue that since inquisitorial judges must have prior knowledge 
of the case before them in order to be effective managers at trial, they unwittingly 
develop intuitive preconceptions and hypotheses that tend to be in favor of one side rather 
than the other.
228
 This bias informs the kind of questions judges raise at trial and, even 
worse, the receptiveness of information gathered generally through the whole process.
229
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But this is not the case with adversarial judges as they do not know about the case prior to 
trial.
230
 
     Although at first blush makes some sense, this argument, if deeply looked into, proves 
unpalatable. On the one hand, we can not assume that judges are necessarily biased when 
they begin trial on an informational basis. Pre-informed judges are like scientific 
researchers. They initiate their research with a modicum of data. Their knowledge 
increases as the research process goes on. Although they might have ab initio some 
preconceptions about the result of their investigation, their desire to reach the truth leads 
them to find out facts that might steer them toward a totally different destination. Their 
integrity and skillfulness get them back on track, should they go astray, particularly when 
they know that they might harbor such inclinations. Having personal stakes or being 
professionally incompetent are fairly different issues. On the other hand, it is actually the 
passive role of the judge and parties domination over trial proceedings that generate this 
bias. Adversarialism, I believe, lends a validation for the stronger party to overshadow 
the weaker. With its capacities, resources, and techniques, the latter is more privileged to 
present its case more cogently than the former. Passive judges would then fall for the 
stronger argument regardless of their supposed impartiality at the outset of trial. Indeed, 
bias is more rampant in the adversarial process than its inquisitorial sibling.   
In addition, if we approached impartiality as the ability of trial proceedings to produce 
truthful results, the balance would once again tip in favor of the inquisitorial system.       
 Having portrayed the modus operandi of adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings,
231
 I 
believe that truth evaporates with the heat of the adversarial battle. Parties are not as 
much concerned with unearthing reality as they are with winning their contest. As an 
American judge once put it,"[the] adversary system rates truth too low among the values 
                                                
230Id.   
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that institutions of justice are meant to serve."
 232
  On the contrary, and as the case always 
is, the inquisitorial judge leads keenly the locomotive of trial until it arrives at the station 
of truth.   
     Let's see for example how things work with respect to witness testimonies. Due to the 
fact that lawyers can hold interviews with prospective witnesses, this contact, as stated 
above, turns into a means of informing witnesses what they are going to say in trial. This 
actually emasculates the veracity of the testimony as witnesses take sides in the dispute 
according to the party that selected them, regardless of the truthfulness of their 
statements.
233
 Even if cross-examination is utilized to counteract this deficiency, it is 
deemed to be inefficient itself as it is always subject to intimidation and trickery.
234
  
     On the other extreme, inquisitorial procedural ethics prohibit party-witness contact.  
There is neither coaching nor preparation of witnesses. They are selected by the judge 
with assistance, rather than supervision, from the parties. Testimonies are kept intact unt il 
uttered in court. Examination is undertaken by an impartial judge who is eager to get to 
the truth. Thus, truth is preserved in a twofold way; on the one hand, it is protected from 
distortions; on the other, it is afforded an appropriate avenue to get out through.   
     Mirjan Damaska recognized this truth-seeking discrepancy between adversarial and 
inquisitorial models in an article written by him around twenty years ago.
235
  Although 
his arguments relate to criminal trials, two of them fit with, and therefore merit 
importation into, this analysis of civil procedure.
236
 Damaska argues that in the 
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233See Langbein; supra note 127, at 833.   
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See id.  
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adversarial model, emphasis is placed more on observing the rules of the contest between 
adversaries than the truthful determination of the facts of the case.
237
 But in the non-
adversarial model "the concern for ascertaining the facts of the case is much more 
central."
238
 Further, he attributes this truth-seeking variance to the disparate ideological 
conception espoused by the two systems. Due to the fear of state power, the evidentiary 
barrier in the adversarial model is so high that truth can not always overcome.
239
 
Conversely, since state power is not viewed with so much disdain in inquisitorial 
systems, the same evidentiary obstacles found in adversarial proceedings are perceived as 
being unnecessary in the pursuit of truth.
240
  
     To round out the picture, the inquisitorial system is more bias-moderating and truth-
seeking than the adversarial system. As a result, the latter is more fulfilling to arbitral 
neutrality than the former.  
 
 
3. Efficiency  
 
Efficiency is an important element of the arbitral process.
241
 It guarantees, as set out 
earlier, the final, binding, time-saving, cost-minimizing, and practical resolution of the 
arbitral dispute.
242
 To be sure, it is the most salient feature that distinguishes arbitration 
                                                                                                                                       
argument too criminally ridden to be incorporated into my analysis of civil proceedings, see Id., at 584-
587.     
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from court litigation. With that in mind, which one of our two compared procedural 
systems is more efficient?    
 
- The Adversarial System  
  
In fact, the adversarial process comprises a set of techniques that reflect the time-
consuming, costly, and ineffective nature of that system. With the passive role of judges 
and their refraining from prompting parties to settle their dispute, the adversarial case 
tends to drag on. The domination of the proceedings by the parties and their dedication to 
"leave no stone unturned"
243
 in gathering facts takes its toll on the economy and accuracy 
of this process.  
     For instance, in a typical discovery of documents practice, the claimant submits to the 
respondent a list of every document that relates to the issues of their dispute.
244
 The latter 
responds with a variety of objections and a lower number of documents than requested.
245
 
The claimant then submits supplemental document requests with deposition demands of 
every relevant person.
246
 Again, the respondent meets these requests and demands with 
either objection or ignorance.
247
 The requests and objections tend to go back and forth 
adding much to the cost and time of resolving the dispute.
248
  In addition, if we postulate 
that discovery is needed to prevent unfair surprises in trial proceedings,
249
 it still does not 
match the nature of international arbitration. More to the point, discovery, when applied 
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to arbitration proceedings, can not function as it does in adversarial systems because the 
power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal are far less than what a typical court of law 
enjoys.
250
 Therefore, arbitrators lack direct authority to sanction noncompliance with 
discovery orders and the required resources to supervise the process.
251
 Even when 
adverse inference is taken against recalcitrant parties, it has arguably little practical 
effect.
252
   
     Another manifestation of this inefficiency on the part of the adversary system is its 
inherent tendency to present evidence orally with lengthy verbal arguments comprising 
irrelevant details and cross-examinations that tend, in my view, to concentrate on 
impeaching witnesses rather than illuminating relevant issues. Also, the verbatim 
recording of the hearings, which includes every single word uttered by parties or 
witnesses, is believed to be yet another addition to the expense of the proceedings.
253
                   
     In sum, the adversary system, I believe, nurtures superfluity at the expense of 
precision; it makes room for wastefulness rather than objectivity.  
 
- The Inquisitorial System  
 
The investigatory nature of judicial control renders inquisitorial proceedings result 
oriented.
254
 It purges those excessive steps taken by parties to gain strategic benefits. The 
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machine of fact finding goes into play only if common sense dictates.
255
 Judges narrow 
the issues of the dispute to those most needed for its settlement.
256
  They rely more on 
written evidence from which they can speedily extract facts and evidence. The 
summarized record keeping does away with any unnecessary and tautological 
statements.
257
 Moreover, lawyers help in drawing consideration to functional evidence or 
useful facts.
258
  Examining witnesses is primarily undertaken by an impartial judge. 
When parties question witnesses, this lengthy adversarial cross-examination is not 
permitted. There is no discovery of documents as practiced in adversarial trials, and no 
depositions either. In my view, by reason of the fact that there is always behind the 
inquisitorial process someone, i.e., the judge, who is all the more enthusiastic to get the 
dispute to a resolution, the inquisitorial system is expeditious, teleological, and, as a 
result, efficient.   
     Form the foregoing, the inquisitorial system is more fulfilling to arbitral efficiency 
than its adversarial cousin. The former is speedy, cost-saving, and objective while the 
latter is sluggish, expensive, and wasteful.   
  
4. Flexibility 
 
The adversarial system comprises a set of such techniques and procedures as pre-trial 
discovery, pre-trial depositions, cross-examinations, oral arguments, verbatim transcripts, 
which reflect the complex nature of that system. This complexity stems from the fact that 
adversarial techniques are rationalized by and dependent upon each other. Oral evidence 
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is justified by the presence of a jury; the active role of the parties finds expression in 
cross-examination, pre-trial discovery is justified by the dichotomy of trial and the fact 
that parties has to be prepared before the hearing event; the verbatim transcript is 
necessary for the conduct of cross-examination. To be sure, the absence of one of these 
techniques detracts from the efficiency of another.   
     By contrast, the inquisitorial system does not maintain such a complex structure since 
it is absent those concepts espoused by the adversarial system. It lack this 
interdependency of procedures. There is no jury, no dichotomy of trial, no hearing event. 
Consequently, there is no need for oral argument, cross-examination, or discovery. If 
such instruments happen to be used, it is at the discretion of the judge; there is no 
inherent right of cross-examination or discovery; parties can present their evidence orally, 
but this is not the norm. I'm trying to depict here the flexibility of the inquisitorial system 
in the sense of the nonexistence of this gamut of interdependent procedures that attend 
the adversary system. Therefore, when utilized in arbitral proceedings, the former, in my 
evaluation, is more satisfying to the value of flexibility than the former.  
                  
   5. Confidentiality  
 
In addition to its previously stated disadvantages, discovery of documents, I believe, is an 
adversarial tool by which much of the confidentiality of arbitration goes into the air. By 
the parties requesting each other to present every document that comes to their mind, 
their keenly maintained commercial secrets are divulged. Whereas the inquisitorial 
system is absent this technique, or at least its unbridled version, it is thus more saving to 
the privacy of the parties and their business dealings.  
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C. An Argument 
 
In the final analysis, my important question, and it is a difficult one, poses itself; which of 
the two procedural systems is closer to arbitration? As for the adversarial system, it is the 
one that endows parties with autonomy and control, significant features of arbitration. 
However, it is inefficient, complex, biased, untruthful, and unveiling to commercial 
secrets. On the other extreme, the inquisitorial system is better in all these respects save 
for the principle of party autonomy. Obviously, the answer of my question is not in the 
absolute. It is not totally siding by either the adversarial or the inquisitorial models. There 
is no entirely arbitral one of them. Each one paradoxically contains arbitral and non-
arbitral elements. The answer, rather, tells of which one is closer to arbitration than the 
other. And here lies the difficulty of this question.    
 
To answer this question, I believe, we have to determine whether there is a hierarchy 
among the principles of international arbitration, i.e., whether some principles take 
prevalence over others. By so doing, the procedural system which is closer to arbitration 
is the one that embraces the most prominent principles of international arbitration.  
     In my view, the notion of rights is not firmly entrenched in the modus operandi of 
arbitration. Arbitration comes at the expense of many rights of the parties. By opting for 
arbitration, they surrender their right to resort to a natural judge within a natural court of 
law. They are not even guaranteed their fundamental rights in the arbitration proceedings 
themselves.
259
 Arbitration rules requiring arbitrators to grant the parties a fair opportunity 
of presenting their sides
260
 do not substitute for applying a full-blown set of procedural 
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rights and guarantees. Twenty years ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit denied parties to arbitration constitutional safeguards in the proceedings 
holding that "[t]he present day penchant for arbitration may obscure for many parties who 
do not have the benefit of hindsight that the arbitration system is an inferior system of 
justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and 
rules of law . . ."
261
 Although the appellate court's view does not unconditionally apply to 
modern day arbitration, it captures its essence. Arbitration, in fact, sacrifices rights for the 
sake of efficiency, expeditiousness, and flexibility. This is the raison d'etre of arbitration 
and its main disparity with ordinary court litigation. That is why people, when having a 
dispute, resort to arbitration.    
     Having said that, yes there is a hierarchy among the principles of international 
arbitration, in which the autonomy rights of the parties come second to the efficiency and 
flexibility of the arbitral process. It follows then that the inquisitorial system is closer to 
arbitration than its adversarial counterpart. It guarantees the efficient, flexible, neutral, 
and confidential determination of the arbitral dispute. It may curb the autonomy rights of 
the parties, but sustaining rights is never the prime objective of such dispute resolution 
system named international commercial arbitration.     
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 Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 
International commercial arbitration is a system that functions in a universal context. It 
does not relate to a certain culture; rather, it has one of its own that is known by a unique 
set of principles and objectives. This fact should be born in mind by those who avail 
themselves of this dispute resolution mechanism. They should relax their cultural 
convictions when negotiating arbitral agreements. They should leave their national code 
of procedure at home when heading to arbitral tribunals. They should, rather, adopt those 
proceedings that are most compatible with their purpose for going to arbitration in the 
first place. Otherwise, the option of national courts would not be much different.  
     This paper responds to the current tendency of utilizing adversarial techniques in 
arbitration proceedings. It concludes that theses techniques are generally inappropriate 
for international commercial arbitration. The inquisitorial system, by contrast, is more 
proximate to the features of arbitration. However, this should not be taken as a culturally-
driven preference of the inquisitorial system per se. It is actually an impartial 
demonstration of the suitability of its very tools with international arbitration. They are 
efficient, flexible, neutral, and confidential, and therefore they are more fulfilling to the 
ambitions of those who prefer international arbitration over national litigation. 
     In corroboration with this conclusion, the ICC makes use of inquisitorial techniques 
and avoids adversarial procedures. On the one hand, it empowers its court and arbitral 
tribunal with such capacities to dominate the arbitral process as inquisitorial judges do. 
On the other hand, it abandons these instruments which are espoused by the adversarial 
system. Furthermore, as the CRCICA rules have shown to be a mixture of both systems, 
they are absent many adversarial devices. There are no pretrial activities save for the 
construction of the arbitral tribunal, no deeply established right to a hearing, no cross-
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examinations, and even the shape of discovery of documents is not clearly recognized. 
Indeed, this is a manifestation of the inconveniency of the adversary system within the 
arbitral process in general.  
     For those international arbitrators who see in the adversarial system more appropriate 
procedures, I say you are far from accurate. In spite of the fact that the adversarial system 
is hospitable to the autonomy rights of the parties, it comprises a set of techniques that go 
against the grain of international arbitration. Autonomy rights are not in essence its only 
and prime objective. Further, some of these techniques are direct upshots of a certain 
approach with which international arbitration has no affinity. There is no jury panel in 
arbitration sessions that justifies the presentation of evidence orally rather than in writing, 
with the attendant lengthy arguments, examinations, and cross-examinations.     
     Last but not least, one international arbitrator
262
 told me that in countries where the 
judicial system is efficient, flexible, and speedy, people tend to prefer ordinary court 
litigation over arbitration. In addition to that, with the judicialization of international 
arbitration and the incorporation of these inefficient, complex adversarial techniques into 
the arbitral process, international arbitration, I believe, would find many a reason to 
vanish.   
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